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THE ROLE OF THE
PRESIDENT AND OMB IN
INFORMAL RULEMAKING*
Peter L. Strausst and Cass R. Sunsteintt

egulatory reform has been a subject of frequent discussion in the
last decade, especially in the context of presidential efforts to
assert control over the rulemaking process. Presidents Nixon, Ford,
Carter, and Reagan have all attempted to increase presidential authority over regulation. In particular, President Reagan has issued two
executive orders that give the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) considerable power over the rulemaking activities of executive
agencies.
In this article, we set forth our views on the role of presidential
supervision in the regulatory process, with particular attention to the
questions raised by the recent executive orders.
These executive orders address problems to which the American
Bar Association (ABA) has spoken most recently in the Report of the
Commission on Law and the Economy, Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform.' Recommendations 3 and 4 of the Commission were as follows:
R

Recommendation 3: A statute should be enacted authorizing the President to direct certain regulatory agencies, both within and outside the
*This essay is a slightly revised version of a report of the Separation of Powers
Committee of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Association. The
authors would like to thank the other members of the committee, E. Donald Elliott and
Peter Shane, for valuable help. In addition, a number of others-including particularly
Ernest Gellhorn, Geoffrey P. Miller, Michael McConnell, Susan Rose-Ackerman, and
Paul Verkuil-provided useful comments.
tProfessor of Law, Columbia University.
ttProfessor of Law, University of Chicago.
'Presidential control of the regulatory process is discussed and approved in AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION,

COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL

REGULATION:

ROADS TO REFORM (1979) [hereinafter cited as ROADS TO REFORM]. The analysis in this
memorandum is, in the main, consistent with the views set forth in that earlier report.
Both overlaps and deviations are described in the text.
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executive branch, to consider or reconsider the issuance of critical regulations, within a specified period of time, and thereafter to direct such agencies
to modify or reverse their decisions concerning such regulations. 'Critical'
regulations should be defined as those the President finds to be of major
significance both to the national interest and to the achievement of one or
more statutory goals in addition to the goal primarily entrusted to the
regulatory agency in question. Such a statute (1) should contain adequate
subject matter limitations and procedural safeguards governing presidential
exercises of this authority; (2) should not authorize intervention in licensing
and rate-making cases and should confine the President to the appropriate
exercise of the agency's statutory discretion upon the basic facts (as distinguished from the ultimate conclusions) determined by the agency; (3)
should provide time for congressional reaction before presidential orders
become effective; (4) should expire after a limited term of years, so that
Congress could refuse to extend the authority if the President did not
adequately take congressional reaction into account; and (5) should not
change the standards applicable to agency actions upon judicial review.
Recommendation 4: An Executive Order should direct federal agencies,
before completing a major regulatory action, to prepare a regulatory analysis open to public comment and, when the President deems it appropriate, to
conduct an inter-agency review under presidential auspices, as a basis for
enabling the initiating agency to appraise the impact of the proposed regulatory action on the achievement of all relevant statutory goals, including but
not limited to those entrusted to the initiating agency. If such an Executive
Order applied only to executive branch agencies, and if experience with
such a review process were favorable, the process should be extended, by
means of an enabling statute if necessary, to agencies defined by present
statutes as independent from the executive branch. Any such order or
statute should provide that the adequacy of such a regulatory analysis would
not present an independent basis forjudicial review. This recommendation
is limited to regulations of general applicability and does not extend to
ratemaking or to licensing and other forms of adjudication.
The Coordinating Group on Regulatory Reform came to believe
that a statutory provision as formal as is suggested by Recommendation
3 was not desirable, and the President has not sought formally to
displace agency authority for substantive decision (although reports of
substantial leverage persevere, doubtless with reason). The following
pages pick up the Commission's emphasis on the need for coordination
by the President in cases of multiple jurisdiction or overarching statutory command, but generally treat the proper ambit of the executive
orders as being to embody a general process for shaping agency policymaking, rather than a particularized process for displacing it-indeed,
emphasizing that the delegated authority for lawmaking remains
'Id. at 2.
11d. at 3.
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where it was put by Congress, in the agencies, and is part of the "law"
which the President is to execute faithfully.
I. "POLITICS" VS. "EXPERTISE":
A PREFATORY NOTE
For a long period, debates over the administrative process have been
influenced by competing judgments on the respective roles of "expertise" and "politics" in regulation. James Landis' model for administration was that of neutral experts, standing above the political fray,
making decisions on the basis of an objective concern with the public
interest.4 Sometimes ;'. different understanding prevails. Regulatory
issues are often said to raise difficult questions of value on which
reasonable people, or those with conflicting interests, may differ. In
this view, there is no unitary public interest, and the relevant solutions
must be based on "political" considerations rather than on the application of expertise. The dispute between these competing understandings helps to account for numerous more particular disagreements in
administrative law.
The two understandings have important institutional implications.
For believers in the value of expertise and neutral administration, it is
important to insulate regulators from political processes, enabling
them to inquire into issues of fact and value with some assurance that
their deliberations will not be distorted by partisan concerns. For those
who believe that regulatory issues present questions to be resolved
"politically"-in accordance with (informed) constituent desires--decisionmaking power should be placed in the hands of those most
accountable to the public. The recent measures taken by President
Reagan suggest a belief in the latter position.
The debate between believers in regulation as application of expertise, and regulation as politics, reflects polar positions that, in our view,
represent more a tension needing to be maintained than positions in
themselves worthy of adoption. Technical expertise rightly plays an
important role in regulatory decisions. It can, for example, set out a
range of plausible options, indicating that that range is broader or
narrower than might have been expected. On the other hand, judgments of value, subject uneasily or not at all to resolution on the basis of
expertise, play a critical role in regulatory questions. The appropriate

'See].

LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

(1938).
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trade-off between risks to human life and the social and economic
dislocations created by environmental regulation-to use a familiar
example-is not a decision that can be made solely on the basis of
immersion into technical matters. Such trade-offs are rightly placed in
the hands of officials who are politically accountable; and they are
rightly subject to public scrutiny and review during the regulatory
process. While it is properly insisted that such judgments be made
within the constraints of law, it is misleading to understand the regulatory process as if it were entirely a matter of applying technical competence.
These considerations have important consequences for the regulatory process. They suggest, for example, that the power to make
important trade-offs should be exercised in such a way as to foster
accountability, and that accountability should be used as a check on the
exercise of discretion. Procedural devices-including, for example,
public explanation of the actual bases of decision-can be important in
this regard. We take up this matter in more detail below.
One style of control, the ideal of "reasoned decisionmaking," often
has been invoked by the federal courts in recent years, and, in our
view, it is an appropriate one. That ideal, as we understand it, has three
central components. First, regulatory decisions should be based on a
detailed inquiry into the disadvantages and advantages" of proposed
courses of action. That inquiry will often be informed by application of
technical expertise. Second, issues of value must be resolved in accordance with the governing statute. Sometimes that statute will require
consideration of particular factors; sometimes it will exclude consideration of other factors; and sometimes it will indicate that some
factors, although relevant, are of secondary importance. Third, to the
extent that issues of value are to be resolved through an exercise of
discretion by executive officials within the confines of statute, it is
important to ensure that the relevant considerations-and the actual
bases for decision--are explicitly identified and subject to public scrutiny and review.
With this general background, we turn to the issue of presidential
control.

See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
'We use these terms rather than "costs" and "benefits," since the latter implicate the
controversial criterion of willingness to pay. See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Separationof Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267 (1981); Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and
Legal Theory.
5
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II. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL
A. Generally
Although all recent presidents have asserted authority over the
regulatory process, President Reagan has taken the most dramatic
steps with Executive Order 12,291 and, more recently, Executive
Order 12,498. To understand the issues associated with increased
presidential control, it is necessary to have some understanding of
these executive orders.
Executive Order 12,291 imposes a number of requirements for
executive agencies to follow in promulgating new regulations and
reviewing existing ones. The most prominent among these states that,
"to the extent permitted by law," regulatory action should not be taken
unless the potential benefits outweigh the potential costs. 7 Other provisions are similarly designed to reduce the economic burdens of regulatory initiatives. To ensure adherence to its requirements, the Order
accords to OMB supervisory power over the rulemaking process. Before promulgating "major rules," all agencies are required to prepare
"draft and final 'regulatory impact analyses'" (RIA) discussing the costs
and benefits of regulatory initiatives.8 The RIA must be submitted for
review and approval by OMB, with OMB enjoying apparently greater
political authority at the draft stage. If a final RIA is not approved, the
agency is explicitly authorized to go forward, merely explaining its
differences with OMB; no such explicit statement is made that agencies
may proceed without OMB approval at the draft RIA stage, which
generally occurs well in advance of any public notice of the rulemaking. It is important, however, to understand that OMB acts in some
respects as the President's personal staff, and that the process operates
in a flexible and ad hoc manner.
Though enforcement may be problematic, the legal analysis of this
issue has been relatively -straightforward. The Justice Department
memorandum accompanying promulgation of Executive Order
12,291 indicated that OMB has no authority to order an agency to
undertake or not to undertake an initiative."This conclusion is consistent with the language of the order itself. The ultimate power of

7

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34
(1982).
8
1d.
'See U.S. Department of Justice, Memorandum re Proposed Executive Order on
Federal Regulation (Feb. 12, 1981), reprintedin Role of the Office of Management andBudget
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decision thus remains in the agency head. But OMB can play a major
role in determining the outcome of the regulatory process and, as a
practical matter, it is unlikely that an agency will issue a regulation in
the face of OMB disapproval. In any event, the exercise of supervisory
power raises the danger, discussed below and perhaps realized in
practice, of displacement of authority vested in the relevant agency
head.
Executive Order 12,498 goes further. That Order establishes a "regulatory planning process" in order to assure the development and
publication of an annual regulatory program." The Order requires the
head of every executive agency to submit to OMB a "draft regulatory
program" that includes a description of "all significant regulatory
actions of the agency, planned or underway," to be undertaken within
the next year." The Director of OMB is authorized to review the draft
program for consistency with administration policy. After the reviewing process is complete, the agency must file a final regulatory plan,
which is used to develop an Administration Regulatory Program that
will be published in the Federal Register. The Order also provides that
if the agency head proposes to take a significant regulatory action not
included in or materially different from the final regulatory plan, he
must submit the action to OMB for review. While this Order is a
considerable extension of Executive Order 12,291, it reflects and
builds upon principles adopted in the Carter Administration for public
disclosure of annual regulatory agenda.
Both executive orders are directed at rulemaking undertaken pursuant to the informal procedures of the notice-and-comment provision
of the Administrative Procedure Act, or particular agency statutes
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act or the Clean Air Act.
Executive Order 12,291 applies to such rulemaking, exempting formal
rulemaking and other on-the-record proceedings. The limited scope
of the order is based on a perception that where matters are to be
decided in on-the-record proceedings, "political" considerations have
been excluded, and the views of outsiders to the proceedings must be
formally conveyed. Executive Order 12,498 is applicable to "significant
regulatory activities," but it is clear from context that the order is
designed to control the processes of rulemaking not required to be
decided on the record.
in Regulations: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
"'Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1,036 (1985).
"Id.
125U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
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The purposes of the two orders are not difficult to identify. Both are
largely a response to the widespread perception that agency decisionmaking tends to be confused and uncoordinated, that the President is
well-placed to consider the whole scheme of regulation rather than
discrete units of it, and that administrators are not adequately accountable to the public in general, and its political executive-designate the
President, in particular.'" Beyond that lies the related perception that
agency heads are, to an undesirable degree, the captives of their own
staffs rather than politically powerful managers of agency business.
Courts have created a number of techniques to attempt to respond to
this problem, including review to ensure that the benefits of regulation
are roughly commensurate with the costs." The value of such techniques is, however, severely diminished by institutional limits of the
courts, which are not well-equipped to calculate the costs and benefits
of regulatory initiatives and are incapable of imposing a hierarchical or
coordinative structure." The orders represent an effort to deal with
the general problem of uncoordinated and insufficiently accountable
administrative decisions.
While the orders on their surface mark a major enhancement of
presidential authority, a significant element of their attractiveness lies
in their potential to expand the effective authority, accountability, and
oversight capacity of the agency head. This potential is particularly
strong for Executive Order 12,498. Requiring the development of an
agency regulatory plan should have the same effect on the regulatory
side as requiring agency presentation of a budget request does for
fiscal planning. It will provide an annual opportunity for the agency
head to focus on the work of her agency in a planning rather than
a reactive mode, stressing broad vision and priority setting, and involving her early enough that one may expect her to have a significant impact on options considered. Fewer staff deals will have been
cut. The requirement of early disclosure of plans-through ventilation of alternatives (in the case of Executive Order 12,291) and
annual statement of the regulatory plan (in the case of Executive Order
12,498)-is thus a means of ensuring that regulatory policy is set by
agency heads rather than staffs. In this respect, the two orders may be
understood, not only as efforts to enhance presidential or OMB power
" See, e.g., J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 166 (1975).

"See, e.g., Aqua Slide N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831
(5th Cir. 1978).
'See Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978).
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as against agencies, but also as a means of enhancing the agency head's
effective control over her staff.
Finally, the orders embody a perception that the principal defect in
administrative regulation is that it has been unduly intrusive and
imposed substantial costs without accompanying benefits. 6 This
perception is of course highly controversial, and we venture no comment on it here.
B. The Need for a Presidential Role
Time has not undermined the ABA's conclusion in Roads to Reform
that greater presidential control over the regulatory process is desirable. The growing professional consensus, reflected in that study, has
been confirmed by subsequent analyses stressing the need to reconsider the way we conceptualize government in "the administrative
state."' 7 The experience under President Carter's Executive Order
12,044, as well as Executive Order 12,291, is of course relevant to these
projections."
Several features of that experience seem to have increased the
benefits and tended to control the dangers of the supervisory process.
OMB has cooperated with a continuing (and desirable) process of
aggressive congressional oversight. No major scandals have emerged.
In addition, OMB has taken steps to protect against contacts with
private groups." On the other hand, some reports have pointed to
disturbing examples of use of OMB authority to distort the regulatory
process. According to these reports, OMB has had private communications with powerful private groups and used such communications as a
basis for displacing discretionary authority delegated to agencies-and
"See First ConcurrentResolution on the Budget: FY82, Vol. 11: Hearings on S. 251-5, 97th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (agency rules designated for postponement or review, President's
Task Force on Regulatory Relief).
"7See, e.g., Strauss, The PlaceofAgencies in Government: Separationof Powersand the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Shane, PresidentialRegulatory Oversight and the
Separation of Powers: The Constitutionalityof Executive Order No. 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
1235 (1981); Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution,and the
Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 125; Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982); J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE (1983).
"'Some reason for caution is afforded by G. EADS, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN'S
REGULATORY DILEMMA (1982), [hereinafter cited as G. EADS] which suggests that the
benefits of the executive order process have been lower, and the costs higher, than might
at first appear.

"See Hearings, supra note 9, at 76 et seq.
'"See J. LASH, A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984); Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of
Management& Budget Supervisionof EPA Rulemaking UnderExecutive Order 12,291,4 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURCES L. 1 (1984). See also, G. EADS, supra note 18.
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none of this has been disclosed to the public." Such charges are denied
by OMB.2 '
It is too soon to venture a final judgment on the performance of
OMB and the relevant agencies under Executive Order 12,291 and,
even more obviously, Executive Order 12,498. The necessary studies
have only begun to appear; considerable work remains to be done.
Moreover, experience under the two orders continues, and that experience, especially now that some of the initial difficulties have been
worked out, will be of considerable importance for purposes of
evaluating the program. The behavior of the executive branch is
properly subject to a continuing process of academic and congressional
scrutiny.
Regardless of how the process of implementation has operated thus
far, there remains a powerful theoretical case, described in detail in
Roads to Reform, for the view that greater presidential control over the
regulatory process is desirable." We summarize the three basic reasons
for this conclusion here. All of those reasons grow out of the concerns
that led the framers of the Constitution to create a unitary executive, a
decision discussed in more detail below.
First, the President is in a good position to centralize and coordinate
the regulatory process. This task has become increasingly important
with the proliferation of administrative agencies, whose responsibilities often overlap with one another. Over a dozen regulatory agencies,
for example, are now entrusted with authority over matters relating to
energy policy. The President is the only "constitutional officer charged
with taking care that a 'mass of legislation' be executed. ' '21 Some sort of
coordinating role on the part of the President is indispensable, especially in light of the considerable discretion with which executive officials are often entrusted. As Judge Friendly has explained, "Each
agency has a natural devotion to its primary purpose.., no matter how
many statutes . . . say that it shall 'consider' other interests as well.
Someone in Government, and in the short run that someone can only

2'See,

col.

e.g., Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1983, at A8, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at A l,

1; cf.

GENERAL

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST-BENEFIT

ASSESSING ENVIRONMENT REGULATIONS,

ANALYSIS CAN

DESPITE LIMITATIONS

BE USEFUL

IN

(1984) (suggesting that

review
process has improved some rules).
2
See Verkuil, Jawboning AdministrativeAgencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980); Cutler &Johnson, Regulation and the PoliticalProcess, 84 YALE
L. J. 1395 (1975); Bruff, PresidentialPower and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L. J.
451 (1979); ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 1.
2
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 702 (1952) (Vinson, C. J.,
dissenting).
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be the President, must have power to make the agencies work together ... "'
Second, the President is electorally accountable. Equally important,
he is the only official in government with a national constituency.
These characteristics make him uniquely well-situated to design regulatory policy in a way that is responsive to the interests of the public as
a whole. Agency officials, by contrast, are only indirectly accountable.
They may also be subject to more parochial pressures. For these
reasons, a supervisory role by the President should help ensure that
discretionary decisions by regulatory agencies are responsive to the
public generally.
Third, the President, by virtue of his accountability and capacity for
centralization, is able to energize and direct regulatory policy in a way
that would be impossible if that policy were to be set exclusively by
administrative officials. These considerations are especially important
when there is a national consensus that regulatory policy should be
moved in particular directions.
It is a significant step from these considerations to the conclusion
that presidential advisors, like those in OMB, should be given the
power to supervise and coordinate the regulatory process. A principal
difficulty here is that there is not an identity between the President and
officials in OMB. The delegation of supervisory power to OMB over
the rulemaking activities of agencies may serve, not to promote accountability, but instead to remove authority from agency heads and to
confer power on staff members in OMB-thus sacrificing accountability and perhaps skewing the process against desirable government
regulation. The problem may be aggravated by the fact that under the
current scheme, there is no workable appeal to the President, as there
was when the Vice-President's Task Force played a supervisory role in
the early stages of the process under Executive Order 12,291.
There are several responses to these concerns-responses that, in
our view, justify approval of the supervisory role set forth in the two
executive orders. First, the case for supervision rests largely on the
need for a centralizing and coordinating role. It may be that OMB
authority will not increase accountability, but at least with appropriate
safeguards such authority will not diminish accountability, and it is
nonetheless desirable on independent grounds. Second, the recent
executive orders should, for reasons discussed above, serve to increase
the authority of agency heads and to decrease the power of agency
staffs. That effort should itself promote accountability, quite apart
"1See

ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 1, at 163 (separate statement of Judge Henry J.
Friendly, concurring in part with the Commission's recommendations).
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from the issue of whether OMB or the relevant agency is more subject
to presidential control. Finally, the relative proximity of those in
OMB-their institutional position close to the President-may justify
the conclusion that they are, in a special sense, his agents for purposes
of supervising the regulatory process.
OMB's role does pose substantial risks. That role will, for example,
strain the capacities of OMB staff and administrators. The officials at
OMB may not have the necessary technical expertise to engage in the
supervisory role, and, most important, their involvement may further
attenuate the link between the final regulation and the rulemaking
"record." But the answer to any such problem rests, we think, in a
proper appreciation of these dangers by the relevant officials and in
continuing efforts to obtain the information necessary to undertake
supervision. In this connection, perhaps the best analogy to the role of
OMB under the executive orders is the role suggested for the courts by
Judge Leventhal: that of ensuring that agencies have taken a "hard
look" at the relevant factors and that the decisions reflect a reasonable
accommodation of the conflicting interests. In many respects, politically accountable decisionmakers have advantages over the courts in
performing that task.
Moreover, the authority to make the ultimate decision rests where
Congress has placed it-in the relevant agency. This understanding
stems from the notion, set out in Myers v. United States," that the
President has the authority to discharge executive officials, but at least
in some cases, no power to make the ultimate decision (except insofar
as the threat of discharge amounts to such power). Under this view, the
President's remedy for conduct of which he disapproves is the politically costly one of removal. Short of that, his authority-and even more
obviously, that of OMB-is consultative and supervisory. Recognition
of the agency as the primary decisionmaker should operate as a substantial safeguard against the risks created by lack of information. And
the understanding that such an allocation is lawfully required should
operate as an important constraint on the operation of the supervisory
process.
There is in addition the familiar danger that the supervisory role will
carry with it political biases that diminish rather than increase the
likelihood of sound administration, endangering the ideal of reasoned
decisionmakingY. The danger is perhaps made more acute by virtue of
the vesting of supervisory authority in OMB, whose own institutional
23272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Myers].
26
See ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 1, at 155-161 (separate statement of William
Coleman, Jr.). For the view that these dangers have been realized in practice, see note 20
supra.
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mission-as an agency concerned largely with costs, on the budgetary
and regulatory sides-may lead to an undue anti-regulatory bias. Deregulation, for example, is often a good idea, but in many contexts
there remains a need for substantial government intrusion in the
private marketplace. A danger raised by the recent executive orders is
that a concern for the costs of regulation, which are more readily
monetized than the benefits, will be permitted to defeat implementation of governing statutes.
While these are legitimate concerns, we do not believe that they are
sufficient tojustify disapproval of the current initiatives. The countervailing considerations are too strong to outweigh this risk, which, it is
hoped, will be diminished by two important constraints. The first is
that the supervisory role must be exercised in accordance with statute-a fact expressly recognized in the two executive orders and vindicated by judicial review. The second countervailing consideration, as
noted, is that the ultimate power of decision remains vested in the
relevant agency.
In light of these considerations, several measures should be undertaken to diminish the dangers and to increase the benefits of the
regulatory process under the two executive orders.
First, 0MB should institute a procedure to ensure public disclosure
of (1) any factual materials it introduces into a rulemaking proceeding
and (2) all substantive communications with persons not associated
with the executive branch whenever those communications appear
pointed at particular issues it is considering. Factual materials introduced by OMB stand on the same footing as factual materials introduced by the agency itself; both belong as part of the rulemaking file, at
least after the notice of proposed rulemaking has been published in the
Federal Register. (Before publication, no such requirements attach.)
This basic principle should apply to "conduit" communications-materials received by OMB from private sources and communicated, with
or without attribution, to the relevant agency. As noted above, OMB
has taken steps to ensure that the process of receiving information
from private organizations will be carefully controlled. But it has been
sharply disputed whether those controls have been adhered to in
practice. We believe that the measures now in place should be supplemented by a more formal procedure. Such a procedure might build
on the similar provisions of the Clean Air Act, which have served as a
benefit to reviewing courts and to the public as a whole and which have
not, in general, been an undue constraint on executive decisionmaking." Formal procedures of this sort would serve as an important
"See 42 U.S.C. § 7607. In confornance with the original recommendations in ROADS
however, we do not advocate adoption of that part of the Clean Air Act that

TO REFORM,
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safeguard against the appearance or reality of distortions of the regulatory process and circumvention of ordinary regulatory requirements.
These general conclusions are in accord with Recommendation 80-6
of the Administrative Conference of the United States, which set Qut
similar disclosure requirements.
Second, agency drafts prepared under the two executive orders
should, as a general rule, be made available on request to relevant
congressional committees after the process of decision has run its
course. During the process of decision, those drafts should be presumed confidential. But after rulemaking activity has ceased, disclosure of such drafts should allay public concerns about the role of OMB
and would provide valuable information to Congress about the nature
of OMB's supervisory role. There are, to be sure, the familiar dangers
associated with disclosure requirements: the decisionmaking process
may be chilled and candor may be less likely. In this context, however,
we believe that those dangers are outweighed by the benefits of disclosure. We also believe that post-activity disclosure is a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting interests. It is also one which conforms to
the best of existing practice under the Freedom of Information Act
and Executive Order 12,291. Disclosure should be understood as a
matter of presidential prerogative, however, and not as an acknowledgement that the principle of executive privilege fails to protect the
process of decision under the two orders. In order to reach this conclusion, it is not necessary to make any general statement about the reach
of the controversial principle of executive privilege.
Third, OMB intervention should be limited to those cases in which it
is called for by the rationale underlying increased presidential control.
Those cases in turn involve two principal contexts. The first involves
the need for coordination and centralization in the regulatory process;
the second involves the need to communicate the views of the President
when important regulatory issues are at stake. Intervention in the
general run of cases should be avoided. In both contexts, intervention
should be undertaken subject to the understandings reflected above: it
must be within the constraints of the governing statute and of the
delegation of primary decisionmaking power to the agency. Limiting
intervention to such cases should emphasize that OMB's role is not to
duplicate the agency's work, or to act as a de novo decisionmaker on
issues of policy, but to bring a wider perspective to bear on decisions in
settings that transcend an agency's more focused responsibilities.
Finally, a procedure should be reinstituted to allow for mediation by
requires disclosure of all interagency communications in the rulemaking file. For general
discussion, see Verkuil, supra note 22.
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the President in cases of disagreement between the agency and OMB.
Such mediation, which existed in the early period under Executive
Order 12,291, would be designed to stress that OMB acts as a surrogate
for the President and that its word is not final. A procedure of this sort
should be used only in unusual circumstances, however, and it should
be instituted with the understanding that even the President has no
authority to displace decisions statutorily delegated to subordinate
officials in the executive branch.
C. The Nature and Limits of
the Budget Analogy
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 are based in part on an analogy
to the role of OMB in the development of the budget. The budgetary
process is now superintended by that office, a task undertaken because
of a recognition, first by the President and later by Congress itself, that
budgetary matters should be resolved by an organization that is both
subject to close presidential control and able to coordinate administration proposals into a consistent and coherent whole. It is now generally
agreed that the centralizing role of OMB is a highly desirable feature of
the budgetary process.
The historical development of the budgetary process is, we believe,
of considerable importance in assessing the recent executive orders.
Initially, of course, budget matters were handled between agency and
Congress, without presidential intervention; indeed, the Treasury Department and the appropriations function were established in ways
that, in comparison to other executive departments and activities,
excluded the President. The expansion of American government at
the beginning of this century first led President Taft to assert as an
executive matter an interest in coordinating agency budgetary submissions. The President's role was given statutory form in 1921, and
quickly came to be accepted as a natural and desirable aspect of executive function.
When, in the wake of Humphrey's Executor v. United States," the FTC
asserted that it need not participate in the budgetary process (as it was
an independent commission), Congress as quickly rejected the assertion and subjected the FTC to that process. While a few agencies now
are directed to send to Congress the budgetary submissions they provide OMB, agency participation in the OMB process is virtually universal. For both agency head and President it provides an annual review,
from a fiscal perspective, of the government's overall priorities and
plans; the benefits of the review are widely acknowledged.
28295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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The recent presidential initiatives may be understood as efforts to
apply the budgetary model to the regulatory context, and there are
indeed parallels between the two settings. In both areas, a central task is
to ensure that potentially conflicting and inconsistent proposals are
coordinated. In both settings, it is desirable to ensure that the President, or those closest to him, are able to supervise the decisionmaking
process. And in both settings, the budgetary model is a device for
increasing (and exposing to public view) control by agency heads over
agency decisionmaking. The process will ensure early injection of the
people in the agency who are most politically accountable, through
their appointment and participation in oversight activities.
There are, however, four important differences that make the analogy an imperfect one. First, the President's role in the budgetary
process is not a final one. Congress must enact the appropriations
statutes. To be sure, OMB insists that agency submissions to it are not
an appropriate part of the process of legislative supervision. But the
fact is that neither OMB nor an agency head who may share OMB's
view of appropriate priorities within his/her agency can effectively
prevent Congress from finding out about those submissions, or indeed
the cutting or reallocation that may have gone on within the agency
itself. In the regulatory context, by contrast, political (that is congressional) review of the President's oversight decisions is not a matter of
course.
Second, in the budget context, statutory authority for coordination is
granted to the President by the Budget and Accounting Act.29 In the
regulatory context, by contrast, it is the agency head who enjoys authority under governing statutes. This distinction, as discussed below,
has important consequences for the respective roles of the President,
OMB, and the agency in the regulatory process.
Third, and relatedly, regulatory decisions must be made pursuant to
standards set down in a statute. When OMB and an agency are deciding on a regulatory proposal, their decision must be consistent with
statutory requirements. By contrast, when OMB and an agency are
deciding on a budgetary request, there are no statutory standards to
govern that decision; the statutory constraints are imposed after rather
than before the executive branch proposal.
The final difference between the regulatory and budgetary contexts
is that there is, in the latter context, an ideal of "reasoned decisionmaking" that is subject to judicial enforcement. That ideal-which, for
reasons stated above, we endorse-makes the rulemaking process less
overtly "political" than the budgetary process. Spending decisions are
2 31 U.S.C.

§§ 501-02 (1982).
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not easily subjected to the constraints imposed on regulation, and the
ideal of reasoned decisionmaking is for that reason less easily applied
there than in the regulatory context.
All of these differences have important consequences for the rulemaking-budget parallel, and for the role of OMB in the rulemaking
process. First, there are limits to the presidential power to make the
ultimate decision. That power remains vested in the relevant agency.
Second, 0MB must exercise its supervisory power in ways consistent
with the governing statute. Some statutes, for example, forbid consideration of costs, or require that costs be considered in a particular
manner; agencies have no authority to ignore such instructions on the
ground that they are inconsistent with the presidential program. The
risks of presidential lawmaking-or, in other terms, of presidential
refusal to undertake activities contemplated by Congress-are pointed
up by the impoundment controversy. In the context of the recent
executive orders, the parallel to the impoundment controversy is quite
precise. It will be recalled that the impoundment problem arose from
an assertion of presidential power not to expend funds appropriated
by Congress." In the regulatory context, the danger involves refusal by
the executive branch to undertake activities that Congress sought to
require in the governing statute.
The executive branch has no general authority to decline to enforce
statutes of which it disapproves.' To say this is not to deny the existence of executive power to allocate scarce prosecutorial resources to
those problems that seem most pressing." But the risk created by the
recent executive orders is of a different character. That risk, in short, is
that the orders will be used to defeat implementation of statutes that do
not accord with the policy preferences of the incumbent administration. 3 The solution lies, we believe, in a number of devices: congressional oversight; judicial review; public disclosure of important features of the regulatory process; and perhaps most important, an
understanding on the part of those entrusted with administration of
relevant orders of the limitations of their role.
I°See
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The final difference between the budgetary process and that involving rulemaking is that the latter process must be undertaken in a less
"political" manner than the budgetary process. The various constraints
imposed by the notion of reasoned decisionmaking do not apply when
the President is developing a budget.
The constraints, referred to above, that characterize the budgetary
process itself are now well-understood and deeply rooted in American
government, and they suggest important lessons for the regulatory
process. OMB has been structured so as to subdue "constituency politics;" examiners attempt to enforce presidential directives, but avoid
contact with interested private groups; a measure of discipline is created by exposure of the President's budget to congressional examination and enactment; there is a distinction, accepted by all concerned,
between permissible general underfunding to reflect national priorities and impoundment of particular funds to reflect presidential disagreement with lawmaking decisions; and benefits have resulted from
the publicity of agency dealings with OMB at various stages of the
budgetary process.
D. The Question of Presidential Authority
Both of the recent executive orders raise the question whether and
to what extent the President may supervise decisionmaking by subordinate officials within the executive branch. The text of Article II is
notoriously silent about the dimensions of the "executive power," all of
which is vested in a President, but the fundamental character of the
choice for a unitary executive requires his involvement, to some degree, in all executive issues." One little noticed phrase of Article I,
Section 2, Clause 1, of'the Constitution appears to speak directly to the
President's right to inform himself about administrative issues. That
phrase empowers him to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."' ' At a minimum, the phrase tells us that there are to be agencies, with heads, who
will have duties; and that the President can demand reports. It is not
hard to infer that these reports may be demanded preliminary to
action, and may be in a form that the President can specify-for
example, an RIA or regulatory agenda. The directory authority is
more difficult; no significant judicial construction of this particular
phrase has occured. In general, Supreme Court decisions furnish
imperfect guidance on the question of' supervisory power. What guid-

"See Myers, supra note 25, at 135.
CONST. art. II, § 2.

"U.S.

198

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

ance there is derives primarily from two early cases dealing with the
problem of presidential power to remove executive officials.
The first is the celebrated case of Myers v. United States.'"' Myers was a
postmaster who had been removed from office by the Postmaster
General at the direction of the President. The relevant statute barred
removal except with the advice and consent of the Senate; it had not
been obtained. The Supreme Court, in a lengthy opinion by Chief
Justice (and former President) Taft, concluded that the statutory restriction on the removal power was unconstitutional. This conclusion
rested in large part upon the grant of executive power to the President
in Article 1I. 7 According to the Court, the vesting of executive power
in the President revealed "an intention to create a strong Executive" in
which the executive power was conferred on "one person."': A requirement that the President obtain congressional authorization for removal of executive officers would impede unity and coordination in
administration and thus reduce the likelihood of prompt and effective
action. '" This result, according to the Court, would have adverse consequences against which the framers had sought to guard by making
provision for a unitary executive.
The central premise of Myers is that the Constitution creates a unitary executive branch. That premise is well-supported by the history
and background of Article II." To authorize Congress to insulate
subordinate officials from executive control would be inconsistent with
the premise; it would enable Congress to create a set of agents for
which there is no constitutional authorization. The problem in Myers
itself was especially acute, for there Congress had given itself a veto
power in the removal process.
At the same time, the Myers Court added two provisos to this tinderstanding of Article II. First, it suggested that it was possible that with
respect to some duties "peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer," there would be a question "whether
the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his
statutory duty in a particular instance."4' Second, the Court noted that
3'272 U.S. 52 (1926).
7
3 U.S. CONST. art.

11.

"'Myers,supra note 25, at 116.
11d. at 134.
""See Strauss, supra note 17.

"See Myers, supra note 25, at 135. The question was one on which early attorneys
general vacillated. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 624 (1823); 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 480 (1831); 18 Op.

Att'y Gen. 31 (1884). In Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. 524 (1838), the Court had given
an earlier indication that the answer to the question ran against presidential revisory
power.
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the President "can not in a particular case properly influence or control" decisions of a "quasi-judicial character imposed on executive
officers and members of executive tribunals.""
The second case, Humphreys Executor v. United States," involved the
legality of President Roosevelt's attempt to remove Humphrey from
his position as a member of the Federal Trade Commission. The
relevant provisions of the FTC Act allowed removal only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office."'" Citing Myers, the
government argued that this provision was unconstitutional insofar as
it restricted the President's power to remove an executive officer "at
will." The Court rejected the argument. The basis for its conclusion
was the nature of the duties performed by Humphrey-duties quite
different from those of the postmaster, who was "restricted to the
performance of executive functions."' Humphrey, exercising what
the Court characterized as quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative duties,' "
did not act in an executive department or exert executive power. The
holding in Myers, according to the Court, was inapplicable to a commission "wholly disconnected from the executive department," which was
"an agency of the legislative and judicial departments.' 7
The language just quoted is, of course, extremely problematic in its
formalism. 0 The suggestion that agencies must be "in" one or another
department is not a necessary one, and is usually made (as here) in the
context of excluding an agency from a particular one of the three
branches rather than locating it in another. For its immediate purposes, the Court did not have to say whether the FTC was "in" the
judiciary or "in" the legislature. Subsequent Supreme Court opinions,
notably Buckley v. Valeo," have suggested that the structural issue is one
of relationship rather than place: because the Federal Election Commission exercised certain law-implementing responsibilities, it had to
have the constitutional relationship with the President that departments do." Of course, this understanding of Humphrey's-that it did
not deny some presidential relationship with the FTC, but held only
'AMvers, supra note 25, at 135.
11295 U.S. 602 (1935).
"Id. at 623.
'"Id.at 627.
"'Id.
at 628.
' 7Id. at 630.
"See generallv Strauss, supra note 17.
"'424 U.S. 1 (1976).
•"For example, presidential appointment of heads; congressional involvement in
appointment limited to confirming presidential choice or assigning appointment to
presidentially appointed figures; and, one may add, the obligation to respond to presidential demands for "Opinions, in writing."
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that Congress could constitutionally regulate that relationship to the
extent of making Commissioners persons not dischargeable at willmerely reopens the central questions: What are the President's constitutional powers to control and supervise administrative officials, and to
what extent can they be shaped by congressional judgment?
In the day-to-day workings of the executive branch, the power to
control and supervise has two components. The first, procedural in
character, is the authority to consult with and demand answers from
the relevant official. The President and subordinate officials in the
White House frequently exercise such authority in attempting to coordinate and oversee the operation of the executive branch.51 Their
authority to do so is unquestionable, given the "Opinions, in writing"
clause of Article I.I. As remarked above, that authority comfortably
extends to all heads of government agencies exercising substantial
law-implementing authority; any other conclusion would deny the
proposition about a unitary executive that is the most centraljudgment
made about the presidency in the constitutional scheme. The President
therefore has the constitutional power to require agency officials to
prepare cost-benefit analyses, to develop regulatory agendas, to file
environmental reports, or to explain the reasons behind proposed
courses of action.
The question of substantive supervisory authority is more complex.
The difficulties arising from the tension between the view of President
as decider (the agencies as delegates of power that is fundamentally his,
and so his to exercise) and the view of President as mere congressional
lackey (lacking any substantive authority save what Congress chooses to
confer on him) are well known5' and underlay the ABA's limited
endorsement of presidential revisory jurisdiction in Recommendation
3 of the Commission on Law and the Economy Report, quoted above?
The tension exists even in those settings in which the President's power
to remove an official who does not do his bidding is unconstrained.
The political reality is that he will not always be able to afford the
political cost of the removal, or to persuade the Senate easily to confirm
the official who docilely will do his bidding. Indeed, as noted, the Court
suggested in Myers that although the removal power cannot be restricted, there may be constraints on the President's authority to displace decisionmaking authority vested in at least some kinds of officials
z"For an example of such control, see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
52See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 80-81 (4th rev. ed.
1957).
5
:See supra note 1, and accompanying text.
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"within" the executive branch.,4 This position derives considerable
support from historical understandings 5 aswell as the text of Article
1I. The consequence is that the President is not authorized either to
make particular decisions statutorily vested in at least some subordinate officials, or to direct those officials to make particular decisionsexcept insofar as the prospect of removal operates as such a direction.
If the President wishes particular decisions to be made, his recourse is
to discharge the relevant official and to appoint a new one who shares
his inclinations).5

We believe that these considerations support the facial legality of
Executive Order 12,291. Under that Order, OMB is given supervisory
authority over the rulemaking functions of executive agencies. That
supervisory authority consists of the power to require statements about
the costs and benefits of proposed rules and to review and comment on
those statements. Such authority fits well within the presidential power
recognized in Myers. Moreover, ultimate power to decide rests with the
relevant agency. To be sure, the order does require agency heads-"to
the extent permitted by law"-to act on the basis of considerations of
cost and benefit.57 That requirement amounts in some degree to a
displacement of decisionmaking authority. But in view of the breadth
of agency discretion in deciding on costs and benefits, and in making
the ultimate trade-off, there is, in our view, no serious question about
the facial legality of the order. This conclusion is buttressed by the
various disclaimers in the order of any authority to displace delegated
decisionmaking power."

The same basic considerations apply to the facial legality of Executive Order 12,498. That order gives OMB a similar supervisory role
54"Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule
or revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then
there may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and
members of executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the President cannot in a particular case properly
influence or control." Myers, supra note 25, at 135. The Court said, however, that even in
such cases the removal power remains intact.
"See
Strauss, supra note 17.
5
1t might seem incongruous to allow unlimited removal power and at the same time to
permit restrictions on substantive supervisory power but, as a matter of logic, there is no
real anomaly. There are political constraints on the exercise of removal power; as a
result, the President will exercise that power only in comparatively unusual circumstances. Moreover, a successor can be appointed only with the advice and consent of the
Senate. For this reason, the supposedly greater power of removal need not carry with it
the supposedly lesser power to dictate decisions.
7
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431-34
(1982).
"Sea Strauss, supra note 17; Shane, supra note 17.
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over the development of annual regulatory programs. But the ultimate
decisionmaking authority remains vested in the agency head. Serious
legal questions might be raised if OMB prohibited the agency head
from issuing regulations not included in the final annual program that
could not have been foreseen at the time that program was completed.
Not enough is yet known about OMB administration of the new executive order to say whether it will be used to direct agencies not to act (a
good deal of political persuasion is inherent in the exercise, we suppose, and an understood element of administration). Textual discussions of the new executive order produced by OMB suggest not,"' but a
flow chart emanating from OMB bears the strong suggestion that it
expects to issue formal clearances without which agencies will not be
permitted to act. The distinction between activating a political process
for agenda and priority setting, and taking over an agency's ultimate
authority, is a subtle one, yet one wants assurance that it will be
observed.
Both executive orders thus raise significant dangers of overextension, dangers against which it is important to guard in the implementation process. Those dangers, as suggested above, fall in two
principal categories. The first, for which the impoundment controversy is the best analogue, involves refusal to undertake regulatory
activities in the face of a congressional judgment that regulation is
desirable at least if certain findings are or are not made and
supported."° The second involves displacement of the discretionary
authority vested in the relevant agency by Congress. The solution to
these dangers lies, we believe, in the various understandings and
mechanisms described earlier in this essay.'
III. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND THE
"INDEPENDENT" AGENCIES
Presidents Carter and Reagan did not attempt to apply their executive orders to the so-called "independent" agencies. This decision was
based largely on fear of the congressional reaction to any such effort
rather than on a judgment that the President lacked the necessary
constitutional power. President Reagan instead asked for voluntary
5'Those discussions tend to stress unforeseen or unforeseeable issues that arise after an
agenda has been agreed upon, rather than how disagreements over predictable issues
will be resolved. A willingness to permit regulation in the former circumstances, while
desirable, does not speak to the latter.
""See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v,. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856
(1983).
" See supra notes 24-29, and accompanying text.
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compliance, a request that was generally rejected.62 In our view, the
President has the power to apply both executive orders to the "independent" agencies. We also believe that he should exercise that power.
The American Bar Association reached analogous though not identical conclusions at the time of the Roads to Reform report. Recommendation 4, the relevant proposal for present purposes, concluded
that if experience under an initial executive order applicable only to
the executive agencies were favorable, the process should be extended,
"by means of an enabling statute if necessary, to... agencies defined by
their enabling statutes as independent from the executive branch."'" 3
The text accompanying the recommendation states: "The Carter
Order, as originally proposed, would have imposed its discipline on
independent agencies as well as executive branch agencies. The final
Order, however, leaves the 'independent' agencies untouched because
many of them objected on legal and policy grounds. A majority of the
Commission regrets this omission."64 (emphasis added). It is time to recognize that considerations of law and policy point in favor of and not
against extensions of the executive orders to the independent agencies-subject, of course, to the various limitations on OMB authority
recognized above.
Humphrey's Executor recognizes Congress' considerable authority to
structure the ways in which the laws it passes are administered, including statutory creation of agencies protected from presidential removal
without cause and somewhat remote from presidential direction. The
law that delegates authority to an independent regulatory commission,
like the law that places final decision in the hands of cabinet officials, is
constitutional, and thus part of the body of law to the faithful execution
of which the President is obliged to see. Yet, as Buckley v. Valeo has since
underscored, Congress cannot make an agency responsible for lawadministration so remote from the President as to defeat the authorities that the President has been granted by Article 1I. Thus, to say that
the President cannot dictate outcomes is not to resolve the question
whether the President can impose requirements that are procedural in
character-as, for example, by requiring consultation or the preparation of particular documents, such as cost-benefit statements. We believe that the President has the authority to apply both executive orders
to the independent agencies, and that he should exercise that authority.

"'See Hearings.snpra note 9.
"'ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 1, at 85.

f"Id.
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While broad dicta in Humphrey's Executor suggest that Congress can
make the immunity of officials from presidential direction almost total,
as by employing the independent regulatory commission device,' 5 no
such question was presented in the case and those dicta have come
under considerable question. There are several reasons we do not
believe the case would be read that broadly today. The first is that
suggested by Buckley, read in conjunction with the "Opinions, in writing" language of Article II; we see no self-evident way of separating the
appointments power from other aspects of Article II, and the same line
of reasoning shows the authority to require opinions to be central to
the President's unitary role. Second, in the case itself, the terms of the
restriction on removal power-which permit discharge for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office" ---appear to contemplate at least some degree of presidential supervision over the activities
of independent agencies. The statutory restriction might, then, be
interpreted as allowing, not forbidding, procedural requirements. To
be sure, such requirements might tend to encourage agency officials to
adhere to the views of the President, and to that extent compromise
what the Court perceived to be their necessary independence. But it is
doubtful that any such effect would be sufficiently great as to overstep
the bounds of the statute itself.
Finally, the facts of Humphrey's were quite limited, providing the
Court no occasion to speak to the permissibility of insulating lawadministering officials from what we have called procedural requirements. Indeed, President Roosevelt had imposed on Humphrey no
procedural or substantive constraints. The case involved a proposed
discharge for reasons of trust, raising the question whether "Congress
could legitimately insist that one holding the office of Federal Trade
Commissioner serve on terms other than those of a personal adviser." 7
Our conclusion that Humphrey's Executorshould not be understood to
preclude application of requirements like those in the executive orders
to the "independent" agencies is based on the understanding, set forth
above, that Article II creates a unitary executive. The Constitution
makes no provision for a category of agencies existing "outside" the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The President is the constitutionally specified agency of the Congress in the implementation of
federal law.
This conclusion hardly resolves all of the complicated issues that

"See supra notes 41-65, and accompanying text.
"Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935).
"7See Strauss, supra note 17, at 615.
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might arise from congressional efforts to insulate officials from presidential supervision. It is arguable that a congressional judgment that
certain functions are to be performed "apolitically" may warrant respect, at least where Congress has been equally careful about its own
involvement in the agency's business. But the notice-and-comment
rulemaking the executive orders seek to control is not such a setting.
Consequently, the statutes governing the "independent" agencies
should not be interpreted to foreclose presidential supervisory power
of the sort reflected in Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498.
From the standpoint of sound regulatory policy, fashioned in a
process of informal rulemaking, we believe that there is no meaningful
difference between the "independent" agencies and those agencies to
which the executive orders are currently applicable. The two categories of agencies engage in regulatory activities that are, from a functional standpoint, indistinguishable. Indeed, often those activities concern the same or similar subject areas; consider the overlapping work
of the Department ofJustice and the Federal Trade Commission in the
area of antitrust. The same considerations that justify a coordinating
presidential role with respect to "executive" agencies apply with full
force to those characterized as "independent." For these reasons, we
believe that Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 should be applied to
the latter set of agencies.
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APPENDIX
American Bar Association
Administrative Law Section
RECOMMENDATION
Resolved,
The American Bar Association supports the following principles
regarding executive oversight of federal agency rulemaking, in particular the implementation of Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498.
1. The Constitution's choice of a unitary executive justifies presidential involvement in rulemaking activities of federal agencies. In
particular, insofar as Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 implement
the President's constitutional authority to "require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices," 8
those orders are appropriate exercises of presidential power.
2. The constitutional principles that justify presidential involvement in rulemaking activities are applicable to both the executive and
the independent agencies. The executive orders should be extended to
the independent agencies because of the need for presidential oversight of all administrative rulemaking activities.
3. Oversight of agency rulemaking by the executive branch, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), should recognize
(a) the placement of substantive decisional responsibility in the agencies; (b) the principle of procedural regularity; (c) the executive's
general obligation to enforce the law as it has been enacted by Congress; (d) the role of Congress in any political process for oversight of
rulemaking activity; and (e) the value of opening the rulemaking
process to public scrutiny and review.
4. Executive oversight should seek to shape the course of agency
policymaking rather than to displace decisions in particular proceedings. The oversight process is most appropriate in (1) setting the
overall priorities of government; (2) matters requiring coordination of
the activities of several responsible agencies; and (3) matters of public
importance involving expression of the policy views of the President.
That process should include explicit and workable provisions for pres-

"'U.S. CONs'r. art. II, § 2.
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idential mediation of any disagreements that may arise between an
agency and OMB in implementing the executive orders.
5. OMB should adopt procedures to ensure disclosure in the relevant rulemaking proceeding of any factual materials it introduces into
the proceeding, and of all substantive communications with persons
outside the executive branch regarding matters undertaken pursuant
to Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498.
6. While reports made to the President pursuant to his authority to
demand "Opinions, in writing" should, in general, be regarded as an
element of the decision process and consequently confidential, agency
submissions prepared under Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 (and
any responsive OMB documents) should, in the absence of special
circumstances, be made available on request to relevant congressional
committees after the rulemaking activity is complete.

